This article reviews recent data on the cost of mental illness and schizophrenia in the United States, comparing figures for 1985 with data from 1955. The rate of increase in all categories of direct costs has exceeded growth in other health care expenditures. Several major issues in measuring the economic cost of schizophrenia and mental illness are important both from the perspective of costs involved and from the perspective of policy. Two of these are discussed: costs to families with a mentally ill family member and costs of publicly owned capital facilities. Correct accounting for these costs is important for making decisions about the relative cost-effectiveness of community-based and hospitalbased treatment programs.
The United States, Canada, and Western European countries devote roughly 1 percent of national income to the treatment of mental illness. Although there is of course some variation in these countries caused by the respective health care systems and their financing, as a rule of thumb these developed countries spend about 10 percent of national income on health care and about 10 percent of the health care budget on mental health treatment. In the United States in 1985, for example, gross national product (GNP) was $4,015 billion, national health expenditures from all sources were $419 billion, and, according to Rice et al. (1990) , costs of treating mental illness (including alcohol and drug abuse) were $47.5 billion. Treatment costs for mental illness alone were estimated to be $39.3 billion.
Direct treatment costs are a starting point for a social accounting of the cost of mental illness. In this article, we begin with a discussion of studies of the direct and indirect cost of mental illness. We then focus on two cost-related issues especially pertinent to policy questions on treatment of schizophrenia and other serious mental illness: costs to the family of the mentally ill and costs associated with publicly owned capital.
Measuring the Direct and Indirect Cost of Mental Illness
Rashi Fein (1958) was the first to discuss the concepts of direct and indirect costs of illness. He defined direct costs as "the actual dollar expenditures on mental illness" (p. 10), and indirect costs as "the economic loss in dollars (or in work years) that society incurs because some part of society is suffering from mental illness" (p. 10). Rice and colleagues' (1990) new definitions are basically the same: direct costs are the actual dollar expenditures related to an illness or disorder, including amounts spent for hospital and nursing home care, physician and other medical professional services, drugs and appliances, and rehabilitation. Indirect cost is the value of lost output due to the reduced or lost productivity caused by illness, disability, or injury. This includes the value of lost workdays and housekeeping days, lowered productivity due to illness or disability, and losses due to premature death. 376 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN hoi, drug abuse, and mental illness (Cruze et al. 1981; Harwood et al. 1984; Rice et al. 1990) . Results from Rice et al. (1990) for mental illness alone are summarized in table 1. Direct and indirect costs are considered so that the total impact of illness on society is measured, thus expanding the accounting beyond the 1 percent of GNP that is devoted to the treatment of illness.
The work of Rice and her colleagues (1990) in the United States is a reminder that an illness like schizophrenia imposes costs in a variety of forms. Table 1 Fein's (1958) estimates for 1955 have been put in the same format as Rice et al.'s (1990) estimates. The basic methodology for the Rice and the Fein work is similar. There was no attempt in the Rice et al. (1990) work to separate the costs of mental illness into diagnostic categories, although Fein and some others making later estimates provided some diagnostic information.
By far the most costly illness was schizophrenia. (Of the 149,089 patients with a first admission to a public mental hospital in 1952, 35,409 [24 percent] were diagnosed with schizophrenia or "paranoia." It should be kept in mind that public facilities were admitting patients with a much broader range of chronic problems in the mid-fifties. After schizophrenia, the next two leading diagnoses at first admission were cerebral arteriosclerosis and senility.) There were some differences in the Fein (1958) and Rice et al. (1990) approaches that tended to increase the costs for 1985. The one exception is that Fein did not distinguish between mental illness and substance abuse, as Rice et al. did . This should make a small difference in cost figures for mental illness in 1955, when most treatment in State facilities was long term. According to figures in 1952, only 4.7 percent of first admissions were related to alcohol and drugs (Fein 1958) .
In all other respects, Fein underestimated costs compared to Rice. Fein's indirect cost is more conservative than Rice's. Fein counted the work lost from residents of psychiatric hospitals and a small percentage of the days lost from work due to disability. Rice counted work lost because of hospital residence, but the largest part of the morbidity costs derive from an income equation estimated for survey respondents from the National Institute of Mental Health-sponsored Epidemiologic Catchment Area survey, with variables measuring the presence of illness in the equation. The results were then extrapolated to the entire economy using prevalence data. In addition, Rice estimated lost work years from deaths due to mental illness; Fein attributed no deaths to mental illness. Fein counted no costs due to fire, accidents, crime, and administration of welfare programs for the mentally ill.
There are many more treatment cost categories with positive entries in 1985 than in 1955, because the mental health treatment system was so much more complex in 1985.
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There were undoubtedly some elderly with mental illness in nursing homes in 1955, for example; but, for the most part, the elderly senile patient was a resident in a State hospital at that time, and Fein justifiably ignored costs for this group outside the State system. One difference in the treatment cost methodology is that Rice et al. estimated the costs of mental illness occurring as a comorbid condition with other illness by attributing the "extra days" for discharges with a morbidity to the cost of mental illness. (While this methodology correctly adds an estimate of the costs for treatment of other illnesses imposed by the existence of the comorbid mental illness, consistency would imply that a subtraction of the contribution of other illnesses when they are comorbid with mental illness should also take place. This was not done in the Rice et al. [1990] estimates.) With these differences in mind, consider the costs of the mental health systems according to the 1985 and 1955 tables. In 1955, GNP in the United States was $410 billion. In 1985, GNP was $4 trillion, an increase of almost 10 times the 1955 figure. The measured cost of mental illness increased 54 times over this same period, going from 0.5 to 2.6 percent of GNP. Treatment and support costs alone (where cost accounting methodologies differed in only minor ways) increased 36 times, much faster than GNP growth.
One way to divide total costs is between treatment costs (direct costs) and lost productivity (indirect costs). In 1985, productivity lost to mental illness accounted for 55 percent of total costs, exceeding the direct treatment costs. It is not meaningful to compare this percentage to Fein's 39 percent, because his method for fig-uring lost productivity was so different.
Considering treatment costs alone, it is possible to make a comparison of the growth of institutional and community-based costs over the 30 years. It is well known that in 1955 the resident census of psychiatric hospitals was peaking in absolute and relative terms at about 500,000, and that, after this date, a growing share of mental health treatment was occurring on an outpatient basis. While this is true, a comparison of the figures for 1955 and 1985 shows that the increased share of outpatient treatment is due entirely to growth of the outpatient sector, not to decline of institutional costs.
In 1955, the Veterans Administration accounted for $257 million of the $285 million spent by Federal providers. Of this amount only $5 million was for outpatient costs. Other Federal providers, mainly Department of Defense facilities, spent $4 million on outpatient care. Thus, outpatient costs for mental illness treatment in 1955 were $9 million from Federal providers, $13 million from other mental health institutions (community-based clinics), and an estimated $100 million for officebased psychiatrists, for a total of $122 million. This leaves $1,017 million as the costs for inpatient care. (To get the number for office-based psychiatrists, Fein multiplied $23,800, the average gross income of psychiatrists in private practice in 1955, by an estimated 4,000 psychiatrists in full-time private practice. Part-time psychiatrists and any costs of nonpsychiatrist physicians are omitted.) Outpatient care in 1955 accounted for 11 percent of costs.
In 1985, Rice et al. do not distinguish between inpatients and outpatients in the Federal costs of $1.4 billion, so pass over this for the moment. Other mental health institution costs included $3.2 billion for multispecialty mental health facilities, which can be counted as outpatient costs. Office-based MDs and other professionals are also basically outpatient, although some hospital visits are counted in the MD cost total. The "other professional" costs are high estimates, but we will use Rice's figures. For non-Federal nondrug costs, outpatient costs were $3.2 million from other mental health institutions plus the physician and other professional costs for a total of $8.8 million, 24 percent of the non-Federal nondrug costs. Applying this 24 percent to the Federal and drug costs leaves us with an estimate of outpatient costs in 1985 of $9.4 billion and inpatient costs of $29.8 billion. It is striking that even with the inflated estimate for psychologists and social workers, outpatient treatment costs are only one-third of costs of institutional care for mental illness in 1985. Figure 1 illustrates the relative rates of growth of institutional and outpatient care over the 30-year period.
One final comparison of 1955 and 1985 is in terms of the sources of funds. The upper portion of tables 1 and 2 can be regarded as a small submatrix, with destination of funds down the column-Federal, State and local, and private providersand sources of funds across the rows-Federal, State and local, and private. In 1955, the 3 X 3 matrix contains only diagonal elements. Federal money went to Federal providers, State money to State providers, and private funds to private providers. The qualifications to the flow of funds are minor. Federal grants to support some outpatient State care amounted to $2 million in 1955, and some private funds were paid to State and local facilities in the form of fees. Fein (1958) estimated these at less than 10 percent of State and local facilities costs. They were omitted from table 2 because Fein believed in most cases these revenues were returned to the general fund and did not represent costs at the facilities.
(If this were known to be true, the Private column associated with State and local facilities should show the private contribution, and this amount should be deducted from the $662 million paid by the State, leaving the total costs unaffected.) By 1985, the diagonality of the sources and uses matrix is disturbed. Although Federal providers only receive funds from Federal sources, Federal funds also flow in significant amounts to State and local and private providers. In the Other treatment costs category, short-stay hos-pitals and nursing homes are also recipients of large amounts of Federal funds. State funds go to State and local facilities, but also to private hospitals, privately owned nursing homes, and private short-stay hospitals. Private funds, including direct pay and private insurance, flow to all institutions except the Federal providers. Crosscurrents in funding flows create incentives for "lower level" actors to tap "higher level" flows, for individuals to use State programs when available, and for States to structure services and programs to capture Federal funds. For example, moving the senile elderly from State institutions to nursing homes is attractive to States because 50 percent or more of nursing home costs are payable by Medicaid, a joint Federal/State program.
In both the Rice and the Fein studies, the estimates presented are the result of the authors' best judgments based on the data available. In many cases the data are too poor to support reliable estimates, and in some cases the authors' judgments can be questioned. There are several major issues in measuring the economic cost of mental illness that are potentially large enough in magnitude and controversial enough in methodology to warrant discussion. These are costs to families of care of a mentally ill member, capital costs, measurement of labor market impacts of mental illness, and nonproductivity losses due to the presences of illness. Detailed discussions of the first two issues follow.
Costs to Families With Mentally III Members
In most cases, persons with mental illness are not in the hospital and not in therapy generating social costs for care from professionals and in institutions. Most of the time, the mentally ill are living at home with their families. Some of the costs of care provided by families, primarily the treatment and legal costs, are contained in the totals in tables 1 and 2. For 1955, Fein says nothing about the costs the family bears that are not reflected in market transactions with professionals. Rice et al. (1990) estimated that the value of time contributed by family members for care of the mentally ill in 1985 was $2.5 billion. Inclusion of family costs is the most significant innovation in the cost methodology of the Rice et al. (1990) study.
Franks (1987), based on her dissertation research in Massachusetts, discussed below, projected costs to the Nation. Based on a figure of 1.3 mil-lion chronically mentally ill individuals living in the community in 1981, she alternatively assumed that the time and money costs for these persons was (1) the same as the median in her study, (2) two-thirds of the median, and (3) two-thirds of the median but only one-half of the families made a contribution. These "high," "medium," and "low" estimates resulted in costs of $6.9 billion, $4.6 billion, and $2.3 billion, respectively. Rice et al. apparently based their estimate of $2.5 billion on Franks' $2.3 billion. There is no discussion in Rice et al. of the family cost estimate, other than to say it came from Franks. Unlike many areas of social policy, the deinstitutionalization movement seems to have shifted the burden of care for needy persons back to the families and away from collectively funded and provided services. Franks' one-point-in-time study, while not documenting any changes, does bear out the hypothesis that families carry much of the cost that at one time would have been paid collectively through State support of public hospitals. Her study raises issues about the fairness of asking aging parents to continue to bear so much of the cost of their adult children's care, the effect of social policies on family's costs, and the total social cost of caring for the seriously ill.
From the viewpoint of psychiatry, the family is often seen as a cause of mental illness because of early childrearing practices or dysfunctional interpersonal family relations. Whether or not the family has an etiological role, there is an undeniable effect on the family when a member becomes seriously ill. The term "family burden" was first applied in England when treatment for the seriously mentally ill shifted to community settings and families were asked to take over functions of State institutions. "Objective" and "subjective" burdens, corresponding roughly to time and money and to emotional disturbance, respectively, were identified in small samples (Grad and Sainsbury 1963; Hoenig and Hamilton 1966) . Similar research has appeared in the United States, following sets of patients.
The most relevant research has, however, been based on a sample of families themselves. Since the late 1970's, when families of the mentally ill began to organize into powerful mutual support and lobbying groups, families have made themselves available to researchers. The largest of these family-based studies, and the only one estimating the economic costs of the family's commitment, was the one done by Franks (1987) in cooperation with the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Alliance for the Mentally 111 (NAMI), an organization founded in 1979 to improve care for the mentally ill and to support families in their roles as caregivers.
In October 1985, Franks sent a 16-page questionnaire to the 997 persons on the mailing list of the Massachusetts NAMI chapter, asking for background data on the family and the ill family member, use of the formal care system, and the time and money contributed by the family. She received 408 usable responses. (After deleting responses from persons not engaged in active care of a family member, the response rate was 48 percent.) In general, NAMI membership is composed of aging parents from middle and uppermiddle class families caring for their schizophrenic children. In Franks' survey, the mentally ill family member was almost always a child (89%) between the ages of 20 and 39 (81%) and diagnosed with schizophrenia (81%). The respondent was an aging (average age 61 years) white (99%) parent with higher than average educational attainment (60% had at least some college) and a median income between $20,000-$29,999. Franks' estimates of the family contribution to care of the mentally ill apply to the large set of families represented by the NAMI membership, but generalization to families not fitting these characteristics is probably not warranted.
Franks' basic findings are summarized in table 3 and figure 2. Dollar amounts and percentages are averages for the entire respondent sample, even if a respondent failed to report expenses in a financial or time category (blanks are treated as "no expense"). Time is valued at $10 per hour. On average, these families spend $3,539 per year on their ill members, and devote 798 hours per year to their care, most defined by respondents as "caregiving." There are many qualifications to these figures, most covered by Franks in what she calls her "exploratory" study, but a very clear picture of family commitment emerges nonetheless. A good deal of money-Franks points out virtually all of "discretionary income" as defined by the U.S. Census-is spent on the ill member; over and above this, the family spends an average of 66.5 hours per week caring for the ill member. (About 5 percent of the respondents reported no time or money costs at all, which is surely inaccurate, and an additional 5 percent in each of the time and money categories also reported no expense.)
The great variance in the reported expenses in all categories reflects the diverse situations of the respondents, and, in the case of some of the time categories, the difficulty Franks had Rice et al. (1990) were right to include only the time costs of families in their estimate of social costs of mental illness for 1985. Support costs, while the biggest monetary expense to families, are necessary whether or not a family member is mentally ill, although in the case of a healthy adult child, these would be unlikely to be borne by the parents. Some "extra" costs in the support category could be attributable to the illness, but these cannot be identified. The treatment costs and some of the "other costs," such as legal costs, would also already be figured in Rice et al.'s (1990) accounting.
Taxpayers should be grateful to these families for providing funds that would otherwise be a public responsibility. All NAMI families are probably doing more than average, and those keeping their ill member at home are making the largest contribution, as measured in Franks' work. Figure 3 gives some idea of the extra expenses a family incurs if an adult child is kept at home instead of in a public hospital. Over the course of 1 year, the family would spend over $2,000 more on care of the child and over 500 hours more taking care of the child (Franks 1987) . This comparison is done without controlling for either the family's ability to care for the ill member at home or the condition of the ill member. Presumably, those who decide to keep the ill member at home are in a betterthan-average financial position, and their family member can function better than average. The comparison in figure 3, if anything, probably understates the extra burden to a family faced with the decision to be the primary residence and source of care.
Franks studied the determinants of the variation in financial and time contribution as well as the overall averages. Time was difficult to predict, but financial contribution was relate'd to a measure of the patient's symptoms, family ability to pay, and, interestingly, a measure of the availability of State community mental health resources. For every dollar spent by the State on community services (not just money targeted to this population), families reduced their costs by $0.10. Under the circumstances, this would suggest that targeted public funds would be very helpful to these families. Although more than the usual amount of uncertainty lies behind the $2.5 billion estimate used by Rice et al. (1990) to estimate the contributions of families in caring for their ill family members, this large dollar figure, more than half the cost of care in public mental hospitals, is a flag calling attention to the family's role and the need for more research. Documentation of the forms of family contribution in other samples is one clear need. More research could refine the value of family time beyond the $10 per hour assumption and do more to investigate the factors that influence a family's decisions about providing financial support and care to an ill member. According to mental health professionals, a caring family is the epitome of an intact social support network, and the absence of such a family is considered the most important barrier to early patient discharge from a hospital. It is clear that families do save collectively financed mental health care costs, but what factors contribute to a family's willingness to assume what would otherwise be a social responsibility? What happens to children as the parents age7 A family allowance for caring for a disabled child or other relative would obviously help the family, but would it affect social costs? Should an allowance or other family support policy be related to family income, or should all families hit by a child's disability be entitled to the same help? How should the support be related to the patient's condition and circumstances? Should the allowance depend on the residence of the patient?
Capital Costs
Capital costs are a vital issue in assessing the cost of public mental health facilities, both for purposes of measuring the total social cost of mental illness and for program evaluation. Issues in capital cost are largely confined to public facilities because it can generally be assumed that private facilities are covering all costs, including costs of capital, in their charges to payers. This is not the case for public facilities. Public capital accounts are often kept separate from public current expenditure accounts. New construction of public mental health facilities was uncommon in 1985. Nonetheless, there should still be a cost charged for the capital the State is holding in the form of the facility, even if it were built and paid for in the past.
This issue arises in the mental health system in the United States and throughout the health care system in countries with a socialized hospital sector. Comments about the National Health Service (NHS) hospital capital in Great Britain in a recent Government white paper (Secretaries of State for Health 1989) proposing changes to the NHS could apply to the mental health system in the United States just as easily: Capital in the NHS has been treated for the most part as a "free good." Once an investment has been made, whether in land, buildings or equipment, no further revenue charges arise from the continuing use of these capital assets. This can lead to inefficiency such as the underutilization of assets, and may also mean that capital costs are not fully taken into account when, for example, comparisons of costs and performance are made between different parts of the NHS, or with the private sector, [p. 18] Further, "The Government proposes to introduce a new system of charging for capital in the NHS" (p. 18), intended to address these concerns. Fein (1958) Rice et al. [1990] declined to follow this approach. In principle, construction and training costs should not be included in current year costs because they represent investments. If these are private sector training and construction costs, these investments will be reflected in future prices when the capital is used. It would thus be double counting to include both the cost of the investment and the part of prices that go to amortize the investment. If the investment is public sector investment, it would be preferable to attribute the cost to the time period in which the capital is consumed.)
Mental health care is usually thought to be labor-intensive, but for the seriously mentally ill treated in institutions, the opposite is true: much of the cost is in the form of land and buildings in which the ill are housed. Valuing this capital is one of the most problematic areas of cost studies in mental health. It can affect the social accounting of the cost of mental illness and the relative costs perceived to be associated with alternative treatment programs. The most common form of treatment comparison for the seriously mentally ill is comparing a traditional treatment in a publicly owned hospital with an alternative communitybased treatment. The hospital building itself is obviously the most significant "input" used in the traditional treatment. How is the hospital to be valued?
The cost of capital is composed of two elements: the change in market value of the capital and the opportunity cost of tying up the capital in its present use. (Operating cost is sometimes identified as a third element, but in health cost studies, upkeep on capital is usually accounted for separately.) For example, suppose I own a unit of capital with a $100 market value at the beginning of the year. What is the cost to me of using that capital for a year? The capital may "wear out" a bit in use, may become somewhat obsolete, and fall in value to $95 (neglecting inflation). This $5 loss is one part of the cost. The other is that I could have sold the capital for $100 at the beginning of the year and invested the money in a bond and earned perhaps $3 interest after inflation. The cost of using the capital is the sum of the change in market value and the alternative rate of return: $8 or 8 percent. Thus, if we ask what is the capital cost of a mental health facility over 1 year, it would be the change in market value of the facility between the beginning and the end of the year and the interest that could have been earned had the facility been sold at the beginning of the year and the proceeds invested. In practice, the first of these elements, the change in market value, is measured by an assumed "depreciation rate," and the second by a measure of the real rate of interest (net of inflation).
For purposes of cost studies in mental health, researchers have frequently accepted per diem charges from facilities as measures of the capital cost. To arrive at a per diem, retrospective cost analysis is used to compute total cost, and this is divided by the number of patient days. Typically, total costs figured in this way include a depreciation component and interest on debt repayment, or a "profit" allowance, in this way at least crudely reflecting the cost of capital.
Anyone who has ever owned a real asset that could be depreciated for tax purposes is in a position to know how badly accounting rules about depreciation approximate change in market value. In fact, of course, the market value of real estate is determined by the demand and supply in real estate markets and bears virtually no relation to accounting rules for depreciation. (Tax rules do have important effects on demand. The more unrealistic the accounting rules for depreciation are, the more attractive the investment is.)
A second problem with using accounting rules as measures of economic costs of capital is that the basis for depreciation is the original cost of the capital, not its current market value. For long-lived assets, such as a mental hospital, the original construction cost will be far under current replacement costs or current market value. Opportunity cost calculations using historical cost can greatly understate the cost of capital.
When mental health treatment occurs in a public facility, the per diem, calculated as total accounting costs over patient days, may include no measure of capital cost at all. The issue in the public system of the cost of public capital is not merely an esoteric exercise for the cost ac-countants: it hits at the core of public policy. The social capital in mental health facilities is in general vastly undervalued by public decision makers, a view that many mental health cost studies fail to contradict. Proper valuation of the capital will lead to the recognition that publicly owned facilities often have an opportunity cost high enough that they should not be used as mental institutions. When many public facilities were first constructed, social policy was to create a separate community for the mentally ill, away from the traffic of the city on farmlike estates. (Kirkbride [1880] , in what Grob [1983] calls the "classic work on mental hospitals," calls for them to be placed 10 to 12 miles from any large town.) Now overtaken by urban growth, the State facility's campus ties up precious social capital. Proper valuation of this capital supports the movement to community-based mental health care.
An Illustration: Capital Costs in the Public Hospital at Mendota, Wisconsin. Capital costs made the difference in the cost of traditional treatment at Mendota and the cost of the now widely emulated assertive community treatment model pioneered at Madison, Wisconsin. Without recognition of the costs of public capital, the new treatment program would have appeared much more expensive than the traditional alternative and policymakers would have paid little attention if the Wisconsin team claimed to be able to achieve better patient outcomes with a more intensive, more expensive treatment program. What was notable about the assertive community treatment model was that, by including an explicit valuation of the cost of capital in the State facility, better outcomes were achieved at about the same social cost. VOL 17, NO. 3, 1991 385 The most well-known program cost analysis in mental health was Burton Weisbrod's (1983) evaluation of the treatment program developed by Leonard Stein and Mary Ann Test. Beginning in October 1972, 130 individuals were randomly assigned to either traditional treatment in the public facility, the Mendota Mental Health Institute (the control group), or to a new community treatment program that has since come to be labeled "assertive community treatment" (ACT). According to Weisbrod's (1983) report, the essential characteristics of the experimental treatment program, ACT, were (1) hospitalization was virtually eliminated;
(2) members of the staff worked with patients in their neighborhoods, places of residence, and places of employment, providing support and teaching the coping skills necessary to maintain satisfactory community adjustment; and (3) staff attempted to minimize the number of patients dropping out of treatment prematurely and to maximize the patients' engagement in jobs and other aspects of responsible, independent community living. It was hypothesized that patients in the new program would have more favorable outcomes at less cost. Table 4 summarizes the results of the costs for the 12 months of the experiment. (Patients were admitted to treatment over the course of 1 year. The first year's data are for the first 12 months for all patients following their admission into the program.) The control group incurred on average over $3,000 in costs in the State facility, while the experimental group had little State facility cost, but high costs in the experimental center and in sheltered workshops. The control group had higher costs for hospitalizations at other hospitals and higher maintenance expenditures (food, housing, etc.) . Overall, the ACT program was $800 more expensive per patient than the traditional treatment. When the financial benefits per patient, measured solely as employment earning, were figured in, the advantage of the experimental group more than offset the cost difference, so that the new program showed a $400 better net benefit figure than the traditional treatment (though both were negative). On measures of program effectiveness-symptomatology and social relationships as judged by trained observers and patient self-assessed satisfaction with life-the ACT program was significantly more effective than the traditional treatment. The cost and effectiveness data together led Weisbrod to conclude that "hospitalization of the mentally ill is, except for emergencies, less effective than community-based treatment of approximately equal cost" (p. 841).
If the social cost of the Stateowned capital embodied in the Mendota Mental Health Institute had been ignored, the message of the research would have been different. The State's per diem at the State facility in 1973 was $70, which included no capital cost for the longpaid-for facility. Weisbrod makes only a brief note about the capital cost assumption, without a discussion of the rationale: "The per diem cost estimate by the State, approximately $70 in 1973, was adjusted upward to allow for an opportunity cost of 8 percent on the estimated value of the land and for the depreciated replacement cost of the physi-cal plant" (p. 820). Figure 4 illustrates the consequences of this assumption. Changing the per diem from the State's $70 per day to the researcher's $100 via the 8 percent cost of capital moved the ACT program from the red to the black. With the 0 percent cost of capital assumption, the ACT program would have incurred costs of $1,738 more per patient per year, a difference reduced to $542 more if the earning advantage is credited to the ACT. Under Weisbrod's 8 percent cost of capital, the $797 extra cost in the ACT is, as we have seen, more than made up by the earnings difference.
The 8 percent cost of capital is probably on the high side. If the market value of the property is steady, there is little cost of depreciation; and there are certainly no investment opportunities that can be counted on to provide a real rate of return of 8 percent. A 4 percent cost of capital may have been a more reasonable choice. Applying this to the Mendota data, the cost per pa- Dickey et al. 1986 . Extended discussion of the capital issue is in Cannon et al. 1985 .) The Massachusetts Mental Health Center is located on a 2.6-acre site within the Boston medical area and is one of the medical facilities grouped around the Harvard Medical School. About one-third of the property is occupied by buildings, some dating back to 1907. During the period of the study, 1979-81, the facility had 90 beds and a large outpatient department. It also housed research and teaching functions. The facility's operating funds were supplied by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. Cannon (1985) recognized that if the value of the capital is V, and the opportunity cost of holding the capital is c, expressed in percentage terms and equal to the sum of the loss in market value and the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in the capital, then the competitive market rental rate for that capital will be cV, just enough to pay the competitive rate of return on capital to the owner. (If the owner was responsible for operating and maintenance costs and this was included in the rental rate, a subtraction would be necessary to get the net rental costs for assessing capital costs.) If this competitive rental rate were observed, the two steps in the Mendota study of (1) figuring the capital value itself, V, and (2) making an assumption about the opportunity cost (8 vs. 4 percent) would both be avoided. Unfortunately, in the case of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, there was no rental rate for the facility and no readily comparable properties in the area to use as a guide, and so the second route of estimating V and c had to be taken. While it may frequently be the case that no rental market information exists that can be helpful to the researcher, it should be kept in mind that if comparable rents are available, this is the most reliable way to estimate capital costs. Cannon (1985) turned up four estimates in her search for the market value of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center. After converting to 1980 prices, they ranged from a low of $2.8 million (from an expert witness testifying on the market value of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center as commercial real estate) to a high of a $13.3 million written estimate from a developer to replace the existing buildings. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts appraised the market value of the property at $9.7 million, and use of the squarefoot value from the sale of a comparable property led to an estimate of $8.9 million.
Applying what Cannon (1985) believed was a range of reasonable opportunity costs, from 3 percent to 7 percent, the annual cost of capital represented by the Massachusetts Mental Health Center facility ranged from a low of $84,656 to a high of $932,624, more than 10 times greater.
There is little reason to think that the Massachusetts Mental Health Center valuation problem is unique. The large ranges reported were due to the researcher's interest in exposing the problems in capital evaluation. Sensitivity analysis of this form should be part of any estimate of the value of social capital.
Discussion
Measuring the economic cost of schizophrenia, and mental illness more generally, has important implications for social policy. This article has discussed two aspects of that cost that have generally not received enough attention in policy debates: the costs borne by families and costs of social capital. Public policy too often focuses narrowly on current budget costs of the public sector, ignoring family costs in the private sector and the opportunity cost of social capital. As a close review of the Mendota experiment reveals, appreciation of the full costs of illness can reverse a policy preference for institutional versus community-based care.
In the United States, it is surely true that the social capital devoted to institutional care of the mentally ill is excessive. The current mechanisms to bring this to the attention of public officials are inadequate. Giving public mental health officials responsibility and authority for their capital budget, as well as a budget for operating costs, is the most direct way to address this problem.
